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1 INTRODUCTION
Suppose that I’m charged with helping a child learn his colours. The child has a number of uni-
formly coloured cubes, and we play the ‘which colour?’ game. This involves him presenting me
with a cube and me saying which colour it is, and then me presenting him with a cube and him
saying which colour it is, and so on. He holds up a green cube, and says ‘which colour?’ I say: ‘it’s
green’. I judge correctly. But is my judgement rational?
It depends on the scenario. Compare two. In the first, Inattentive, the game has been going on
for what seems like hours, and I am losing the will to live. I go through the motions and just guess
that the cube is green, without even looking. Though my judgement is correct, it is not rational.
In the second scenario, Perception, I am playing the game properly and attentively. Based on what
I can see, I judge that the cube is green. In Perception, my judgement is rational in the light of my
visual perception.
This illustrates the phenomenon I want to focus on: the rationalizing role of visual perception.
My interest is in whether reflecting upon this enables us to settle a dispute in the metaphysics of
perceptual experience: that between representationalism and naive realism.1
In §2 I clarify what it means to say that perceptions are rationalizing. In §3 I set out Ginsborg’s
(2011) argument which aims to show that reflecting upon the rationalizing role of perception sup-
ports representationalism.2 In §4 I show how this argument can be extended so as to challenge
naive realism. In §5 I explain why these arguments fail. I do not claim that reflecting upon the
rationalizing role of visual perception supports naive realism over representationalism. Rather, I
doubt that we can settle the dispute by reflecting on the rationalizing role of perception.
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2 THE RATIONALIZING ROLE OF VISUAL PERCEPTION
What does it mean to say that perceptions rationalize beliefs? We can answer this by appealing to
a conception of the rationalizing role of psychological states developed in Ginsborg (2006).
Ginsborg distinguishes between first-personal and third-personal senses of reasons for belief.
In the first-personal sense, a subject’s reason for belief is a ‘fact which presents itself to the subject
as favouring the belief’, it is ‘typically a consideration which she herself will cite in defending her
beliefs’ (pp. 289–290): e.g., the fact that the streets are wet is my reason to believe that it has rained
(Stampe, 1987).
But it is the third-personal sense of reasons for belief that concerns us here. Such reasons are
involved in third-person assessment of the rationality of someone else’s beliefs:
. . . if I am assessing someone else’s beliefs, then I need to determine how things
present themselves as being from her point of view. AsWilliam Alston puts it, “when
we ask whether S is justified in believing that 𝑝. . .we are. . . asking a question from
the standpoint of an aim at truth; but we are not asking whether things are in fact
as S believes. We are getting at something more ‘internal’ to S’s ‘perspective on the
world’. . . .we are asking whether the truth of 𝑝 is strongly indicated by what S has
to go on” (1985, p. 71). To give someone’s reason for a belief by way of answering the
kind of question Alston describes, is to specify a psychological state, typically another
belief, in the light of which her original belief can be recognized, from a third-person
perspective, as rational (Ginsborg, 2006, p. 290).
Part of what it is for 𝑆 to have a reason for the belief that 𝑝, in the third-personal sense, then,
is for 𝑆 to be in a psychological state in light of which her belief that 𝑝 can be recognized, from
a third-person perspective, as rational. This is what it is for a psychological state to rationalize
a belief.
In Inattentive there are no psychological states that I am in in light of which my judgement
that the cube is green can be recognized, from a third-person perspective, to be rational. Nothing
in my ‘perspective on the world’ indicates that the cube is green. But in Perception I am visually
aware of a visibly green cube. In light of this perception, we can recognize my belief that the cube
is green as rational. My perspective on the world, including, as it does my perception of the visibly
green cube, strongly indicates that the cube is green. In this sense, my perception rationalizes my
belief.3
3 MINIMAL REPRESENTATIONALISM
In this section, I will consider how reflection on the rationalizing role of perception can ground
an argument for a minimal form of representationalism—the view that the visual experiences
involved in visual perceptions have worldly (i.e. world representing) representational contents.4
I present the argument in summary form and clarify the minimal form of representationalism
it supports in §3.3 below (and there is more on representationalism in §4.3). The argument is
based on Ginsborg’s (2011) discussion. Ginsborg holds that explaining the rationalizing role of
perception
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seems to require that we ascribe some kind of representational content to perceptual
experience. . .For on a certain natural line of thought, perception of an object cannot
rationalize a belief, that is, make it rationally intelligible, unless it presents the object
as being a certain way, that is, as having a certain general property or feature (p. 135).
Ginsborg endorses this natural line of thought, and thus her core claim is that we cannot
account for the rationalizing role of perception unless we take perceptions to be representational:
to be or involve mental states or events with worldly representational contents.
To see how this claim can be supported, it is useful to distinguish positive and negative claims
in Ginsborg’s discussion:
∙ Positive claim: a visual perception’s being representational is explanatory of its rationalizing
role5
∙ Negative claim: it is difficult to explain a visual perception’s rationalizing role unless we take it
to be representational
Together these claims support the core claim.6 Let’s consider how these claims can be sup-
ported.
3.1 The positive claim
I see the cube and form the belief that the cube is green. My perception of the cube rationalizes
my belief. But why?What is it about my perception of the cube which means that in light of it this
particular belief can be recognized, from a third-person perspective, to be rational? To account for
the rationalizing role of my perception in this particular case, we need to explain this. And more
generally, we need to explain what it is about particular episodes of perception which means that
they rationalize the particular beliefs that they rationalize.
To put the explanatory demand another way, if a perception rationalizes a certain belief, then
there can’t be an arbitrary association between the perception and the belief (Smithies, 2019,
p. 95): there has to be something about the perception which means that it is fit to rationalize
the particular belief in question.
Returning to the particular case in focus, we can meet this explanatory demand if we take my
perception of the cube to have representational content in which the cube is represented as having
a property: e.g., if we take it to involve visually representing the cube as a green cube, or to be a
green cube (Ginsborg, 2011, p. 136). If my perception has such specific representational content
we can make sense of why it is fit to rationalize my belief that the cube is green.
We can bring this out further by asking what it is about my perception which means that it
rationalizes some beliefs but not others. My belief that the cube is green is rationally intelligible
in light of my perception of the cube, but, all else being equal, it would not be rational for me
to believe the following in the light of my perception: the cube is red; the ball is green; there is
merely a patch of light there (etc) (Ginsborg, 2011, p. 136). We can make sense of this again on the
assumption that my perception is one in which I visually represent the cube as green and not: the
cube as red, or the ball as green, or a mere patch of light (etc).
We have support, then, for the positive claim. A second argument for the same conclusion
is based on some of Ginsborg’s more controversial assumptions about the rationalizing role of
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perception. To outline this, let’s switch to one of Ginsborg’s examples: the belief that there is a
package present.
What, then, of the assumptions? The first assumption is a conception of the rationalizing role
of belief whereby beliefs are rationalizing when they bring reasons—in the first-personal sense—
into view. The second is that we should model the rationalizing role of perception on this concep-
tion of the rationalizing role of belief. And third is a factualist or propositionalist conception of
(first-personal) reasons for belief.
These assumptions are controversial, but the point is that if we make them then again we have
support for the positive claim. Your perception of the package rationalizes your belief that a pack-
age is present. This means, according to the above, that it must bring into view a reason for you to
believe that there is a package present—in the form of a suitable fact or proposition, e.g. there’s a
brown rectangular thing there. But what is it about your perception of the package which explains
how it does this? Again, appealing to the idea that perception has representational, indeed propo-
sitional, content can help to meet this explanatory demand (2011, pp. 144–145).
The idea here, presumably, is that perceptions are belief-like in having contents of the sort that
beliefs have, and this is part of how we can make sense of how perceptions, like beliefs, make
propositional reasons available to their subjects. By representing that there’s a brown rectangular
thing there, your perception is able to make available to you the propositional reason that there is
a brown rectangular thing there. Just as by representing that the streets are wet, your belief is able
to make available to you the propositional reason that the streets are wet. If these psychological
states didn’t have such propositional contents, then it is not clear how they would make such
propositional reasons available to their subjects. (I return to this in §5.2.)
3.2 The negative claim
We can see the support for the negative claim as developing out of the above two arguments. First,
then, is the claim that it is hard to see how we can explain what it is about particular perceptions
which means that they rationalize the particular beliefs that they rationalize (and not others)
unless we appeal to the idea that perception has representational content. And second is the idea
that it is hard to see how we can explain how perceptions can make reasons available to subjects
without appeal to the idea that they have representational contents. There are thus explanatory
challenges for non-representational approaches.
Ginsborg supports these claims by carefully considering and finding fault with various non-
representational options that might be invoked to meet these challenges.
Consider again, then, my perception of the cube which rationalizes my belief that the cube is
green. Suppose that we understandmy seeing the cube not in terms of representation, but in terms
of themere presentation of the cube (Ginsborg, 2011, p. 136).
Now, if all we know about my perception is that I am merely presented with a green cube, we
don’t know much at all about the perspective on the world I have in perceiving as I do. We don’t
know much about what my perception indicates to me about my environment. For all we know,
my perception may be illusory or lacking in detail, or confused. We certainly don’t know enough
to know that ‘the cube is green’ is rationally applicable on the basis of my perception—rather
than, say, ‘the cube is red’, or ‘the ball is green’ or ‘it’s a mere patch of light’ etc (Ginsborg, 2011,
p. 136). But then it is hard to see how my seeing the cube gives me a perspective on the world
which indicates to me specifically that the cube is green. And it is therefore hard to see how my
seeing the cube makes available to me a reason to believe that the cube is green.
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Let’s return now to Ginsborg’s package example. An improvement on the mere presentation
idea, is that in seeing the package, you have experiential access to some of the features which are
relevant to the judgement that a package is present (e.g., its colour and shape, its being a pack-
age), and that’s why seeing the package (a) gives you a perspective on the world which indicates
specifically that a package is present, and (b) brings into view a reason to believe this.
But what is it for features to be experientially accessible? Here Ginsborg appeals to the notion
developed in Brewer’s discussion of the Müller-Lyer diagram (2004, p. 70), which applied to the
present case yields the following: ‘the colour, shape, and functional kind of the package are expe-
rientially accessible. . . if the package has [these features], and if we are capable of coming to see
that it has them’ (Ginsborg, 2011, p. 138).
The problem is that this doesn’t explain what it is about your experiential access to the object’s
features which means that your perception indicates to you that it has those feature. And it there-
fore doesn’t capture how your perceptionmakes available to you a reason to believe that the object
you see has the features in question (2011, p. 138).
So, a further option that Ginsborg considers, drawing on Brewer (2008), is the idea that ‘in the
straightforward case where you take the package to be a package, the visual similarity of the pack-
age to paradigm packages makes [rationally] intelligible your taking it to be a package’ (p. 138).
But Ginsborg thinks this doesn’t help either. She highlights how the package’s similarity to a
paradigm package is relevant to understanding how your perception can be rationalizing only if it
figures in your perceptual experience in the right kind ofway. The similarity needs to figure in your
experience such that your perception indicates to you that there is a package-like thing there. If it
doesn’t figure in your experience in this way, thenwe can’t understand how ‘it’s a package’ is ratio-
nally applicable to what you see in light of your experience. However, Ginsborg suggests, it is hard
to make sense of how the similarity could figure in your experience in the relevant way without
appeal to representation. Theorists who deny representational content to experience can appeal
to no more than that the package you see is in fact similar to paradigm packages (2011, p. 139).
To summarize, the argument for the negative claim is that if your perception of an object ratio-
nalizes your belief that 𝑝, then there has to be something in how the object is presented to you, or
the way in which it is presented to you, which explains how your perception provides you with a
perspective on the world which indicates that 𝑝. For otherwise we can’t account for how your per-
ception rationalizes the particular belief in question (as opposed to others), and we can’t account
for how it brings into view a reason for that particular belief. But various non-representational
options fail to make sense of this. It is thus hard to make sense of unless we appeal to the idea that
your perception has representational content.
3.3 Summary
We can summarize the overall argument thus:
1. Visual perceptions cannot play a rationalizing role unless they are representational
2. Visual perceptions can play a rationalizing role
Therefore,
3. Visual perceptions are representational
To say that perceptions are representational is to say that they are or involve mental states or
events with worldly representational contents. We’ll understand this as the idea that such per-
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ceptions are or involve visual experiences with worldly representational contents.7 Thus we can
understand the conclusion here as equivalent to a restricted and minimal form of representation-
alism about visual experience: the view that the visual experiences involved in visual perceptions
have worldly representational contents. This is restricted as it is limited to visual perceptions (and
so does not concern non-perceptual hallucinations), and it is minimal in that it doesn’t state (a)
anything about the nature of experience, or (b) the conscious character of experience (more on
these matters below). We can thus take this to be an argument for minimal representationalism,
and we can call it the Representationalism Argument.
Premise (1) is supported by Ginsborg’s core claim that in order to account for the rationalizing
role of perception we need to take perception to be representational. This section has set out a
case for this.
I have spent a lot of time discussing (1) rather than (2), because (a) I want to take issue with
(1), and (b) Ginsborg doesn’t say much to support (2) directly. But I do take it to be evident that
visual perceptions can play the sort of rationalizing role highlighted here. And I think that this is
plausible in light of the sorts of cases we beganwith. It is plausible to describe cases like Perception
as cases in which visual perception plays a rationalizing role, for this makes sense of such cases,
and how they differ from cases like Inattentive.
I understand the reference to ‘visual perceptions’ in this argument to be unrestricted. That is
not to say that all visual perceptions are rationalizing—that all visual perceptions are linked to
actual beliefs which they rationalize. That is clearly not the case, given that visual perception is
belief-independent (Dretske, 1969). The point is rather that any visual perception has rationaliz-
ing potential.
4 DOES NAIVE REALISM FAIL?
In contemporary philosophy of perception representational theories of experience are often pit-
ted against naive realist theories (see the introductions to Nanay (2010) and Brogaard (2014)). It
is natural to ask, then, whether the Representationalism Argument not only supports a represen-
tational theory but also refutes a naive realist theory. I’ll explore this below, but first let’s set out
naive realism.
4.1 Naive realism
Naive realists focus on the experiences we have in cases where we genuinely perceive aspects of
mind-independent reality. Such perceptual experiences have conscious characters: for any given
perceptual experience there is something it it is like for its subject to undergo it. Naive realism is a
theory of the nature of such experiences and their conscious characters. According to this theory,
it is in the nature of perceptual experiences that they are basic non-representational perceptual
relations to aspects ofmind-independent reality. Andwhat it is for a certain perceptual experience
to have the conscious character it has just is for it to be a basic non-representational relation
between a subject and certain aspects of mind-independent reality.
In light of this, the naive realist emphasizes that the conscious character of a perceptual expe-
rience is as it is, at least partly in virtue of the nature and character of the mind-independent
objects we are perceptually related to. As Martin (2004, p. 64) puts it, the aspects of the
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mind-independent world that we are perceptually related to constitutively ‘shape the contours
of the subject’s conscious experience’.
This doesn’t mean, of course, that the conscious character of a perceptual experience is as it
is entirely in virtue of the nature and character of perceived aspects of mind-independent reality.
The naive realist holds that what it is for an experience to have the conscious character it has is
for it to be a basic non-representational perceptual relation between a subject and certain aspects
of mind-independent reality. Thus, naive realists can hold that as well as facts about perceived
objects, facts about the subject of experience, and facts about the relation between the subject and
the objects of experience are relevant to determining conscious character.8
The idea that the perceptual relation is ‘non-representational’ falls out of the idea that it is
‘basic’.What thismeans is that it is psychologically primitive:9 it cannot be analysed or understood
in terms of more basic psychological notions, including representation.10
To illustrate, consider the visual experience I have when I see the green cube. I have an expe-
rience in which a cube-shaped object looks green to me. The naive realist holds that this expe-
rience is, in its nature, a basic non-representational perceptual relation to a suitable aspect of
mind-independent reality: a green cube-shaped object. And what it is for this experience to have
the conscious character it has just is for it to be so. In the case in question, this structure is realized
by my being related to the particular green cube in question.11
4.2 The representationalism argument extended
Now, as noted, representational theories are often pitted against naive realist theories. This makes
sense for, aswe’ve seen, the naive realist holds that it is in the nature of perceptual experiences that
they are basic non-representational perceptual relations to aspects of mind-independent reality.
It is thus not in the nature of perceptual experiences that they are representations of such aspects
of mind-independent reality, contra certain representational theories.
And, as we’ve seen, the naive realist holds that what it is for a certain perceptual experience
to have the conscious character it has just is for it to be a basic non-representational relation
between a subject and certain aspects of mind-independent reality. It cannot be, then, that what
it is for a certain perceptual experience to have the conscious character it has just is for it to be
a perceptual representation in which aspects of mind-independent reality are represented to its
subject, as certain representational or intentionalist theories hold.
There are different contrasts here.12 In being a relational theory, naive realism opposes repre-
sentational theories which appeal to object-independent representations to capture the nature
of experience and experiential character.13 And in being a non-representational relational theory,
naive realism opposes representational theories which, in capturing the nature of experience and
experiential character, appeal to a perceptual relation, but one accounted for in terms of object-
dependent representation (see McDowell (2008, 2013)).14
It is unsurprising, then, that some authors categorize naive realism as an anti-representational
theory of experience: a theory which denies that perceptual experiences are representational, and
so denies that they aremental states or events with representational contents. For instance, Nanay
(2015) classifies naive realismas an ‘anti-representationalist’ view,where anti-representationalism
‘is the view that there are no perceptual representations’ (p. 154). And Burge (2005) says that naive
realism ‘holds that in veridical perception, there is no representational content of the perceptual
state. The only “content” is the entity or entities that are perceived’ (p. 40).
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If this is right, then the Representationalism Argument can be straightforwardly extended to
apply against naive realism by adding:
4. The denial that visual perceptions are representational is built into naive realism
To yield:
5. Naive realism is false.
4.3 The extended representationalism argument rejected
However, naive realists should reject premise (4) and thus reject the extended Representational-
ismArgument. As Logue (2014) argues, we should be ‘compatibilists’ and hold that the denial that
experiences are representational is not built into naive realism (p. 220).15
But how is this possible? What room is there for anything representational if experiences are
just basic non-representational relations?Didn’twe already outline how this non-representational
relational account excludes appeal to representation?
Not quite. What such an account excludes is an appeal to the idea that experiences and their
characters are in their nature representational. But that is not the same as excluding representation
per se. Compare: from the fact that it is not in the nature of this table that it has a book on it, it
doesn’t follow that it doesn’t have a book on it; from the fact that it is not essential to this table’s
being what it is that it has a book on it, it doesn’t follow that it doesn’t have a book on it.
The claim that experiences are representational is theminimal claim that they have representa-
tional contents (recall the above discussion of minimal representationalism). This view is weaker
than the claim that experiences and their characters are in their nature representational. Call this
‘non-minimal representationalism’. The point, then, is that though non-minimal representation-
alism is incompatible with naive realism, minimal representationalism is not (c.f. Logue, 2014,
p. 239). Given this, (4) fails.16
In light of this, the naive realist can hold that my perception of the cube rationalizes the
belief that the cube is green, and what is explanatory of this is the fact that my perception
involves a visual experience with representational content. It’s just that the naive realist will
insist that it is not in the nature of my experience and its conscious character that it is repre-
sentational. My experience and its conscious character is to be understood in terms of a basic
non-representational relation to a green cube, and whatever representational features it has are
somehow non-fundamental.17
This view maintains naive realism, but concedes that we need to appeal to the idea that expe-
rience is representational in order to to explain the rationalizing role of perception. Call this con-
cessive naive realism.
4.4 The representationalism argument modified
I’ll now argue that the Representationalism Argument can be modified so as to challenge the
concessive approach.
To build up to this we need to introduce the idea that the conscious character of perception is
explanatory of its rationalizing role.18
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Consider, again, some of the explanatory questions we raised earlier: What is it about my per-
ception of the green cubewhich explainswhy it providesmewith a perspective on theworldwhich
indicates that the cube is green? What is it about my perception of the cube which means that my
belief that the cube is green can be recognized, from a third-person perspective, to be rational in
the light of my perception? What is it about my perception which means that my belief that the
cube is green is rational, and certain other beliefs are not? What is it about my perception of the
cube which brings into view a reason for me to believe that the cube is green? We can highlight
the explanatory role of the conscious character of perception by highlighting how the fact that
my perception has a certain conscious character, specifically one in which the cube looks green
to me, helps to answer these questions.
The claim is that the conscious character of perception is explanatory of its rationalizing role at
precisely those points where earlier we claimed that we needed to appeal to perceptual represen-
tation. This gives rise to a challenge. For, on the face of it, we have to choose between the current
claim, and the earlier claim.What is explanatory of a perception’s rationalizing role? The fact that
it has a certain conscious character? Or the fact that it is representational in a certain way? We
can make sense of one of these facts being explanatory, but it is hard to make sense of them both
being. Call this the Explanation Challenge.
Now, a plausible response to this challenge is to maintain that there isn’t the kind of separation
between representational properties and conscious character that the challenge presupposes. We
can hold that a perception has conscious character in that the experience it involves does. And we
can add that an experience’s having the conscious character it has just is for it to be a perceptual
representation of a certain kind, as per non-minimal representationalism. For instance, my expe-
rience of the cube has a conscious character in which the cube looks green to me, and since it is
in the nature of this experience that it is a perceptual representation of a cube as green, what it is
for this experience to have the character it has just is for it to be a visual representation of a cube
as green.
But the concessive naive realist cannot respond in this way to the Explanation Challenge.
For they are opposed to non-minimal representationalism. They draw a line between the
non-representational relational conscious character of experience on the one hand, and its
non-fundamental representational features on the other. It is difficult to see, then, how they can
reconcile the fact that a perception’s having a certain conscious character is explanatory of its
rationalizing role with the fact that its being representational in a certain way is explanatory.
We can thus modify the Representationalism Argument as follows:
(i) Visual perceptions cannot play a rationalizing role unless they have representational con-
scious characters
(ii) Visual perceptions can play a rationalizing role
Therefore,
(iii) Visual perceptions have representational conscious characters
The case for (i) is: (a) to account for certain facts about the rationalizing role of visual percep-
tions we need to take visual perceptions to be representational. But (b) appealing to the conscious
character of visual perceptions accounts for those same facts. And (c) a plausible way of reconcil-
ing (a) and (b)—so aswe don’t get explanatory competition between representation and conscious
character – is to take conscious character to be representational.
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Not only does this argument deliver a much stronger representational theory than the original
version of the RepresentationalismArgument, it can be extended so as to rule out even concessive
naive realism:
(iv) If naive realism is true, visual perceptions don’t have representational conscious characters
Therefore,
(v) Naive realism is false
5 NAIVE REALISM SAVED
How should the naive realist respond?
One approach is to try to maintain concessive naive realism, and push back against some of
the moves made above. For instance, the naive realist might suggest my experience of the cube
is a representation of a cube as green in virtue of being an experience with a certain conscious
character: in particular, in virtue of being an experience in which a cube looks green to me.19 And
with this they can suggest that the fact that my experience is one in which a cube looks green to
me, and the fact that it is one in which I represent a cube as green don’t compete to explain the
rationalizing role of my perception of the cube. If, that is, they can argue that thanks to the fact
that the latter depends upon the former, they share explanatory powers such that there aren’t two
sets of powers competing to explain the perception’s rationalizing role.20
Though it might be possible to develop such an approach, it raises difficult questions. Is this a
better option than the one proposed by the non-minimal representationalist? What are the details
of the proposed dependence of representational properties on conscious character? How are we
to understand the idea of shared explanatory powers?
If these questions can be satisfactorily answered, then that is good news for the naive real-
ist. But I don’t want to defend naive realism by attempting to answer these questions. Instead, I
will develop a response that takes a step back and questions something at the heart of the pro-
representationalist and anti-naive realist arguments we’ve been considering: whether we really
do need to appeal to the idea that perception is representational in order to explain its rationaliz-
ing role.
5.1 The character argument
The crux of this response is that once we have the idea that the conscious character of perception
explains its rationalizing role in play, we can see our way to rejecting the idea that we need to
appeal to the idea that perception is representational in order to explain its rationalizing role, and
we can see our way to undermining the argument in §3.
But are we so sure that the conscious character of experience is explanatory of its rationalizing
role? Perhaps the representationalist could push back on this and suggest that representation and
not conscious character is explanatory of experience’s rationalizing role.
This isn’t plausible. To see this, let’s return to some of the ideas considered earlier about the
rationalizing role of perception. My perception of the green cube rationalizes my belief that the
cube is green. Thanks to my visually perceiving as I do, there is, in Alston’s terms, something
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‘internal’ to my ‘perspective on the world’ which indicates the truth of my belief. Thanks to my
perception, the truth of this belief is ‘strongly indicated by what [I have] to go on’ (Alston, 1985,
p. 71).
Let’s label whatever it is about my perception which means that it gives me such a perspective,
𝐹. Suppose, then, that 𝐹 has nothing to do with what it is like for me to perceive as I do: 𝐹 is
not the conscious character of my experience, nor is it an aspect of the conscious character of
my experience. But then it is very hard to see how 𝐹 can be an aspect of my perception which
means that I have a perspective on the world, a perspective in which the world is some way for
me, let alone one in which it indicates to me, specifically, that the cube is green. And it is thus very
hard to see how 𝐹 could be explanatory of my experience’s bringing into view a reason for me to
believe anything.
The point is that unless 𝐹 is or is an aspect of the conscious character of my experience it is very
hard to see how it can make any difference to how things are ‘internally’ with me, or to ‘what I
have to go on’.
So itwould be implausible for the representationalist to suggest that representation andnot con-
scious character is explanatory of perception’s rationalizing role. This doesn’t mean that represen-
tation is not explanatory. Just that if it is, it is not instead of conscious character being explanatory.
However, having highlighted this explanatory role for conscious characterwe can begin to ques-
tionwhether we need to appeal to representation at all. Consider again the argument we extracted
from Ginsborg’s discussion which suggested that it is hard to see how we are to explain the ratio-
nalizing role of perception without appeal to representation. The argument is that for my percep-
tion of the cube to rationalizemy belief that the cube is green, there has to be something about how
the cube is presented to me, about the way in which it is presented, which explains how my per-
ception provides me with a perspective on the world which indicates specifically that the cube is
green, andmakes available tome a reason to believe this. But various non-representational options
fail to make sense of this.
But an option that Ginsborg doesn’t consider is what we can call the character option. We can
agree with Ginsborg that in order to make sense of how my perception of the cube rationalizes
my belief that the cube is green we need to consider the way in which the cube is presented to me,
or how the cube is presented to me. But we can capture this in terms of the kind of experience I
have of the cube in seeing it, where this is understood in terms of conscious character: in terms
of what it is like for me to experience as I do. The thought is that highlighting that my perception
is one in which the cube looks green to me is to highlight something about the way in which it is
presented to me, or how it is presented to me, which does make sense of why ‘the cube is green’
is rationally applicable in the light of my perception.
Ginsborg argues that we need to correct for the shortcomings of the non-representational
options she considers by appealing to representational content, whereas my suggestion is that
this neglects appealing instead to conscious character. Now, Ginsborg might not worry about this
if she assumes that conscious character is representational, in the manner of non-minimal repre-
sentationalism. In which case highlighting this option doesn’t help us in defending naive realism.
The question, though, is what would entitle Ginsborg to make this assumption? So far, the case
for a representational view of conscious character comes from the supposed need to appeal to
representation in explaining the rationalizing role of perception. But invoking the above option
undermines this case. As conscious character is invoked as explanatory whether or not it is repre-
sentational.
Appealing to a representational account of conscious character does not do any explana-
tory work when it comes to explaining the rationalizing role of perception. Though appeal to
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representation may do explanatory work in the metaphysics of experience, it doesn’t add any-
thing to the explanation of the rationalizing role of perception that we haven’t already captured
by appealing to conscious character.
The point, then, is that the character option is, in a certain sense, a non-representational option.
And it is a better option than the ones that Ginsborg considers. For unlike those other options, it
does enable us to make sense of how perceptions are rationalizing without an appeal to represen-
tation.
To be clear, I am not assuming here, with naive realists, that conscious character is non-
representational. The character option is not a non-representational option in that sense. The
character option is a non-representational option in this sense: it explains the rationalizing role of
perceptionwithout appeal to representation, that is, without appeal to representation in the expla-
nation. This is consistent with the idea that conscious character is representational after all—but
that would be a point outside of the scope of the explanation of the rationalizing role of perception.
To put it another way, the character option highlights that what is explanatory of the rational-
izing role of perception is something theory-neutral (at least when it comes to the theories we are
considering). Conscious character—the cube’s looking green to me—is invoked as explanatory,
not any metaphysical account of conscious character. Regardless of which metaphysical account
of conscious character we opt for, it is the conscious character of my perception which explains
its rationalizing role.
This, then, is what we can call the character argument: the argument that we do not need to
appeal to the idea that perception is representational in order to explain its rationalizing role,
for we can appeal instead to perception’s conscious character, quite apart from any metaphysical
account of conscious character. Such character is explanatory, and its being so doesn’t require any
representational account of it.
How does this help us to save naive realism? It doesn’t entail naive realism or embed a naive
realist conception of conscious character. But it does help us to defend naive realism from the
anti-naive realist arguments we’ve been considering: since these arguments rely on the claim that
we need to appeal to the idea that perception is representational in order to explain its rationaliz-
ing role.
5.2 The character argument defended
One reply to the character argument pushes back on the claim that we do not need to invoke a
representational account of conscious character in securing its rationalizing role.
In §3we distinguished two strands of argument. One is to dowithwhat it is aboutmyperception
of the cube which means that it provides me with a perspective on the world which indicates,
specifically, that the cube is green. Here it makes sense to appeal to my perception’s involving an
experience in which the cube looks green to me. Plausibly, for my perception to give me such a
perspective just is for it have such a conscious character. But it doesn’t matter to this what the
nature of conscious character is.
However, another strand invoked Ginsborg’s more substantive commitments about the ratio-
nalizing role of perception. Accordingly, modelling the rationalizing role of perception on that of
belief (as Ginsborg conceives of that), my perception of the cube rationalizes my belief that the
cube is green only if it brings into view a reason, in the form of a fact or proposition, to believe
that the cube is green (e.g., the fact that the cube is green).21
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Now, the reply is that if the cube’s looking green to me is just a matter of me visually repre-
senting that the cube is green, then we can explain how it makes the fact that the cube is green
available to me. But it is hard to see how it makes this fact available to me if it doesn’t have this
propositional structure. So, even if appeal to the conscious character of experience is explanatory
of the rationalizing role of experience, we are mistaken if we think that this appeal does not also
need to invoke a representational, and more specifically propositional, understanding of percep-
tion and conscious character.
There are a number of ways the naive realist can respond to this worry.
First, they can query why we have to understand the rationalizing role of perception in terms
of experience’s bringing reasons into view. Even if this is the deep explanation of how beliefs are
rationalizing, why should we invoke it to explain how perceptions are rationalizing? Though there
must be something in common to the way perceptions and beliefs rationalize, why must there be
a shared deep explanation of this?
This question is especially pressing if such deep explanations force us to make commitments
about the nature and structure of the psychological states in question (beliefs and perceptions).
If we already think that perceptions are belief-like in involving propositional representation and
thus in having contents of the sort that beliefs have, then we might be happy with a shared deep
explanation. But what if one’s starting point is that perception and belief are radically different?
Then one might question why we should model the deep explanation of how perception is ratio-
nalizing on that of belief.
Now, even if we do understand the rationalizing role of perception in terms of perception’s
bringing reasons into view, another thing that can be questioned is why we should go along with
a propositionalist or factualist conception of reasons.22 Thismightmake sense if, again, one thinks
of perceptions as very similar to beliefs. But if our starting point is that perception is very different
to belief then one might start instead by asking what is made available to us in perception, and
then build a conception of the reasons perception provides from there. This will only lead to a
propositionalist or factualist assumption about reasons if propositionally structured entities are
made available to us in perception. But many deny this. And thus we find authors who claim,
for instance, that perception makes property instances available to us, and that these can serve as
reasons (Kalderon (2011)23 or that perception makes available physical objects, and that these can
serve as reasons (Brewer, 2011, 2018).24
Finally, the naive realist might offer the following more concessive reply. Suppose we accept
that perceptions are rationalizing only if they make propositional reasons available to their
subjects. Still, we can question why we should assume that the only way perceptions can do
this is by being propositionally structured themselves, or having propositionally structured
conscious character.
It might be, instead, that an upshot of having a perception of an object with an appropriate
conscious character, for a subject with appropriate cognitive capacities, is that an appropriate
propositional reason is available to them. And that this can be so even if the propositional reason
in question is not a content of their perceptual experience, or constitutive of the character of their
perception.25
We can make sense of this on an understanding of what it is for a fact to be available to one as
a reason, where this is a matter of being in a position to cite the relevant fact as a reason for belief
(Ginsborg, 2011, p. 144–145).26
Consider nowmy perception of the cube. Let’s suppose that in virtue of having this perception, I
am in a position to cite the fact that the cube is green inmy thinking about the cube. But this is not
because my perception already involves this fact as a content. It is rather because my experience
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presents the cube to me in such a way that I can recognize it to be a green cube. Insofar as I am
in a position to recognize it to be a green cube, I am in a position to cite the fact that the cube is
green as a reason to believe that the cube is green.
But if my perception of the cube and its conscious character is non-propositional how does
anything propositional get into the picture at all—why should my perception have any proposi-
tional upshot? And why should it have the specific propositional upshot it has—wherein I am in
a position to cite the specific fact that the cube is green?
In response to the first question we can appeal to cognitive capacities which are capacities
for generating propositional representations. For instance, recognitional capacities, capacities for
generating states of recognition: recognising that such-and-such is the case.27 The idea, then, is
that non-propositional perceptions can have propositional upshots, for subjects with such capac-
ities, as they feed the exercise of such capacities. They provide inputs to propositional represen-
tation generating operations. In seeing the green cube, the green cube is brought into the scope
of my cognitive life so that, by exercising my recognitional capacities, I am able to recognize it as
what it is. And this is to propositionally represent it in a certain way.
Thus even if my perception of the cube doesn’t itself have propositional structure, propositional
structure gets into the picture at the level of propositional representation generating capacities
and what they generate. Given that I have such capacities, my perceiving the cube has the propo-
sitional upshot of my being in a position to recognize it to be such-and-such a way, and thus to
cite the fact that it is such-and-such a way as a reason to believe that it is such-and-such a way.
But why should those capacities generate the specific upshots they generate? If my perception
of the cube is non-propositional, and so doesn’t propositionally represent that the cube is green,
why should I come to recognize that the cube is green? The cube is green, and this green cube is
perceptually presented and made available in my cognitive life, but why is that aspect of the cube
picked up, as it were, in my cognitive engagement with it, when other aspects of the cube aren’t?
Here we can, again, appeal to the conscious character of my experience: the cube looks green to
me. This, we can suppose, means that the cube’s green character is manifest to me. Thus, the cube
is perceptually presented to me in such a way that I am enabled, in my cognitive engagement with
it, to recognize that it is green.
Thus, a naive realist can hold that even if my perception of the cube is non-representational, it
puts me in a position to cite the fact that the cube is green as a reason to believe that the cube is
green. Being in such a position is an upshot of my perception, given that it presents an object to
me, and is of a certain experiential kind, with a certain conscious character (one inwhich the cube
looks green to me), and given that I have certain cognitive capacities (given that I can recognize
green cubes).
6 CONCLUSION
Though it is tempting to suppose that we need to invoke representation in order to explain the
rationalizing role of perception, I’ve argued that we can resist this by highlighting that the con-
scious character of perception is explanatory of its rationalizing role, and that this is so whether
or not we take conscious character to be representational.
If what I’ve argued is correct, then with respect to the extended Representationalism Argu-
ment the naive realist can reject premise (1) (that visual perceptions cannot play a rationalizing
role unless they are representational). And thus with respect to the modified Representational-
ism Argument, they can reject premise (i) (that visual perceptions cannot play a rationalizing role
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unless they have representational conscious characters). Therefore, naive realists can reject the
anti-naive realist arguments considered here, and they can do so without conceding that we need
to invoke a non-fundamental layer of representation.
Though one of my aims here is to defend naive realism, I do not claim that reflecting upon the
rationalizing role of visual perception enables us to settle the dispute between representationalism
and naive realism in favour of naive realism. Rather, I doubt that we can establish or reject either
theory by reflecting on the rationalizing role of perception.
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ENDNOTES
1 Though I won’t always mark it, I’m focused on only visual perception throughout. I don’t assume that the dis-
cussion here applies to non-visual perception.
2 For arguments in a similar vein see McDowell (1994), and Brewer (1999), and c.f., Martin (1992).
3 Some will want to frame these ideas in terms of perception providing evidence or justification for belief. I think
there are ways of understanding these notions on which saying that perception provides evidence, or justifica-
tion, is just another way of talking about the rationalizing role of perception that I am talking about here. On
these ways of understanding these notions I have no problem with such a re-framing. However, these are not
the only ways of understanding these notions. Because I don’t want to get bogged down in discussion of these
notions, and I because I want to be as faithful as possible to the arguments of Ginsborg which are in focus here, I
stick to talk of the rationalizing role of perception and the way of understanding this drawn from Ginsborg that
I have outlined in the main body of the text.
4 A note on terminology: representationalism is sometimes also called ‘the content view’. I understand intention-
alism about perceptual experience as not equivalent to representationalism, but to be a specific, more committed
version of representationalism. As I understand intentionalists, they hold that conscious character is explained,
at least in part, by representational content. And in the context of the Problem of Perception they accept the
common kind claim (Crane & French, 2015). I take neither of these commitments to be built into representa-
tionalism. For an excellent overview discussion of intentionalism, see Crane (2009).
5 This is no stronger than: a visual perception’s being representational at least partially explains its rationaliz-
ing role.
6 To echo Ginsborg’s wording (2011, p. 144), I have formulated the negative claim as the claim that it is difficult
to explain a visual perception’s rationalizing role unless we take it to be representational, even though the core
claim is that we cannot account for the rationalizing role of perceptions unless we take perceptions to be rep-
resentational. Accordingly, I take it that the negative and positive claims support, rather than entail, the core
claim. The thought is that the core claim looks very plausible in light of the negative and positive claims.
7 Ginsborg frames her discussion both in terms of perception and perceptual experience.
8 For further discussion see Logue (2012) and French (2018). Logue (2012) highlights a role for facts about the sub-
ject. When it comes to facts about the relation, some highlight a role for the manner or way in which subjects
are related to mind-independent objects (French, 2014; French & Phillips, 2020; Martin, 1998; Soteriou, 2013),
and others claim that we need to highlight a role for a third-relatum encompassing circumstances of percep-
tion. (Brewer, 2011; Campbell, 2009). These ideas are not necessarily exclusive. Indeed, one might attempt to
understand facts about theway in which one perceives mind-independent objects in terms of the third-relatum.
9 The claim is only that the relation is psychologically primitive, not primitive simpliciter.
10 Sturgeon (2000, p. 10), Brewer (2011, p. 94), Kalderon (2011, p. 220) and Soteriou (2013, p. 87).
11 Naive realists usually offer amore qualified statement of their view. They hold that perceptual experiences are at
least in part relations to aspects of mind-independent reality (Martin, 2004, and Soteriou, 2013). This means that
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naive realism is consistent with there being aspects of the nature of experience which are not to be understood
in terms of perceptual relations. For ease of discussion, I don’t invoke this qualification here because it won’t
figure in the discussion below. But I do think that the qualification is important, and I don’t see why naive
realists should go beyond the weaker qualified claim.
12 The more qualified naive realismmentioned previously holds that these contrasts hold for those aspects of expe-
rience where naive realism applies, even if not for experience in its entirety.
13 This is typical of intentionalist versions of representationalism. See fn. 4 above.
14 Similarly, in being a non-representational relational theory naive realism opposes a theory of the sort defended
by Schellenberg (2011) which invokes ‘inherently relational’ representational content (p. 740) in accounting for
the nature of experience.
15 See also Martin (1998), Bengson, Grube, and Korman (2011), Siegel (2011), Soteriou (2013), Gomes (2017), and
‘reconciliatory’ views in Part Three of Brogaard (2014).
16 (4) is in even worse shape if the naive realist opts for the qualification mentioned in fn. 9 above.
17 This isn’t to say that such features are not necessary features of my experience. Something can be a necessary
feature of my experience even if it is not an aspect of the nature or essence of my experience, and so what is
fundamental to it in that sense (c.f. Fine, 1994).
18 In different ways, various authors emphasize the epistemic power of conscious character, e.g., Campbell (2002),
Schellenberg (2018), and Smithies (2014, 2019). C.f. Lyons (2009).
19 Compare here versions of naive realism which hold that experiences have their representational properties in
virtue of their relational, character-determining natures, see e.g., Logue (2013), and Gomes (2017).
20 Compare here what Robb and Heil (2019) call ‘inheritance solutions’ to the exclusion problem in the mental
causation debate.
21 If one is uncomfortable with the fact that the cube is green serving as a first-personal reason to believe that the
cube is green, we could modify the example to: the fact that the cube is green looking.
22 Ginsborg drops this assumption at one point. For critical discussion see French (2019, pp. 186–189).
23 See also Johnston (2006) on the epistemic significance of perception making property instances available to us,
though he doesn’t speak of reasons.
24 For critical discussion of such approaches see Cunningham (2018).
25 Note that this sort of picture will be shared by the many representationalists who think of the content of per-
ception as non-conceptual and non-propositional, but think that this content somehow gets transformed into a
propositional content in post-perceptual cognition. See also Reiland (2015) who remains neutral between naive
realist and representationalist theories (fn 23), but who appeals to recognition infused ‘seemings’ as ‘interface
states which mediate between [non-conceptual] sensation/perception on the one hand and central cognition
on the other by putting sensory or perceptual data into a conceptual format usable by the cognitive system.’
(p. 512).
26 See also McDowell (1994).
27 For a detailed defence of the importance of recognitional capacities in the epistemology of perception, and an
account of such capacities see Millar (2019).
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